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This paper models the probability of 15-year-old children missing 
school or being late. The paper sets out to uncover the effects of family 
background and birth order on attendance. Looking at birth order effects 
allows one to test Sulloway’s “Born to Rebel” hypothesis that older 
siblings are more compliant than their younger siblings. Using data 
from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) for 
Germany, Korea, Ireland, Mexico, Russia and the United States, the 
evidence here provides little support for the hypothesis in general. The 
paper finds, somewhat surprisingly, that the socio-economic 
background of the teenagers has very little effect either. Those from 
single parent households are however more likely to have poor 
attendance. However their experience of -or attitude- to school has 
significant effects as has class size, which is negatively associated with 
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Missing school, skipping classes or turning up late for school has interested a 
range of scholars, educators, educationalists not to mention students themselves. Such 
behaviour may indicate underlying problems with the individual or the school and it 
generates a waste of resources. The academic literature on the subject mostly draws on 
psychological and sociological perspectives ‘though there is also a small economics 
literature that touches on it. That there are so many different possible perspectives on the 
phenomenon renders it difficult to summarize, however briefly, the literature.  
Psychologists focus on personality and cognitive characteristics of the individual 
students. For example Rayner and Riding (1996) find a role for learning or cognitive 
style: students at the Wholist end of the Wholist-Analytic style dimension being more 
likely to miss school
1. `Wholists’ tend to be more intuitive, more non-conformist and 
more likely to engage in lateral reasoning while those at the other, `Analytic’ pole, tend to 
be more compliant, prefer structured approaches to reasoning, and the use of systematic 
methods of investigation. Kee (2001) finds that attributional style of students has an 
impact on truancy. Bimler and Kirkland (2001) consider no less than 73 motives for 
truancy.  In a more sociological vien, McNeal (1999) uses the notions of cultural and 
social capital to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the impact of parental 
involvement on truancy. He shows, inter alia, that the positive effects of parental 
involvement only hold for those from some, more economically, advantaged 
backgrounds.  
Economists view an individual’s decision to miss school (or indeed to drop out) as 
based on comparing the expected costs and benefits in a rational choice framework. The 
benefits are the returns from further investment in human capital. The costs include 
opportunity costs of truancy: the value of what they are missing out by attending school, 
see for example Mora (2001). Outside labour market opportunities are likely to be an 
important part of the opportunity cost of schooling. Dustmann, Rajah and Smith (1997) 
measure how British teenagers divide their time between school and work taking into 
account the incentives to work including the economic circumstances of the parents. 
Bacon (1997) argues that NAFTA has had a major effect on truancy in Mexico (one of 
  1the countries studied here) through its impact on the local labour market. The question of 
outside labour market opportunities would be particularly important in less developed 
countries (LDC’s) and hence the research literature on child labour provides an 
alternative perspective. For example Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) consider seasonal 
variation in school attendance (and hence child labour) in rural India as a form of self-
insurance with little overall effect on human capital acquisition. 
From the very brief overview above it is clear that there are many and varied 
perspectives on the causes of poor school attendance. No single model will be able to 
capture all dimensions of the problem not least because it is extremely unlikely that any 
dataset would be rich enough to allow to empirically examine these dimensions. In what 
follows I first focus on the potential importance of birth order effects since these shed 
light on wider scientific questions. However the paper also examines the rôle of family 
effects since the familial environment would be expected to have a range of economic 
and other influences on children
2 and school effects since these are obviously likely to be 
relevant.  
 
2 Birth order effects 
 
Frank Sulloway’s monograph “Born to rebel” argued that birth order played a 
central rôle in the determination of temperament and hence was instrumental in how 
individuals subsequently behaved as adults in particular their propensity to be radical or 
conservative. Sulloway’s arguments are both complex and subtle and no attempt to do 
justice to his arguments can be made here. Briefly, he argued that first-borns were more 
likely to be conservative and later-borns were more likely to be radical. Evidence from a 
range of `revolutions’ both political and scientific was provided to support the hypothesis. 
His argument is motivated by Darwinian psychology whereby children compete for 
parental resources. First-borns, it is argued, tend to be conservative with and are more 
likely to be content with the status quo. Last-borns, by contrast, lack the advantages of 
their first-born siblings in terms of access to parental resources and therefore are more 
likely to create their own niches within the family using a number of strategies including 
rebelliousness. The book assembles an impressive mixture of quantitative and historical 
research to support the thesis. 
                                                                                                                                                     
1 These two cognitive styles are sometimes associated with the right and left hemisphere of the brain 
respectively ‘though this “split-brain” approach is something of an over-simplification. 
  2While Sulloway’s book has gained much attention in the academic world and 
indeed elsewhere his results are somewhat controversial and have failed to receive wide 
support in the academic literature. Steelman and Powell (1985) find some effects of birth 
order on personality and leadership skills though not on academic performance. More 
recently Freese, Powell and Steelman (1999) and Steelman, Powell, Werum and 
Carter(2002) have cast doubt on Sulloway’s general hypothesis. An alternative 
perspective appears in Saroglou and Fiasse(2003) who argue using Belgian data on a 
sample of three sibling families that it is the middle-borns who are most rebellious and 
impulsive. It is argued that first and last borns occupy similar niches by displaying 
conformity with their parents. Using a sample of 20 students, Zweigenhaft and Von 
Ammon(2000) find that last-borns are more likely to participate in civil disobedience 
(specifically, a strike at a K-Mart store) consistent with the Sulloway hypothesis. 
However it seems doubtful that one can generalize much from such a sample.  
This paper attempts to shed light on the Sulloway hypothesis by looking at the 
effects of birth order on whether teenagers are well behaved at school, specifically 
whether they arrive late or miss school. While this does not directly analyse personality 
traits it seems very plausible that the rebelliousness implied by the theory would generate 
poorer behaviour at school by teenagers such as missing school or being late
3. Herbst and 
McCrae (1998) point out that Sulloway, contrary to recent evidence, assumes that birth 
order effects continue into adulthood. By looking at teenagers (15 year olds) this paper 
provides a strong test of the theory since if one does not find evidence of rebelliousness at 
15 years one is even less likely to find it in adulthood. 
It needs to be borne in mind that “birth order” by itself is not an unambiguous 
concept. Sulloway emphasize the importance of functional birth order, a second born 
raised by grandparents would be functionally a first born. Similarly if there is large gap in 
time between the birth of a second and third born then the latter, it could be argued, is 
more likely to behave like first born. A similar distinction is made by Adler(1956) who 
emphasizes the importance of psychological birth order
4.  
                                                                                                                                                     
2 For data reasons we are unable to consider issues of temperament, personality or other psychological 
variables. 
3 Obviously this is my interpretation of Sulloway’s arguments, not necessarily his. 
4 See White, Campbell, Stewart, Davies and Pilkington(1997) for a recent application. 
  3In this paper, largely for data reasons, only biological birth order is considered. 
However it can be argued that it has the advantage of being objective and unambiguous 
and is not contingent on other concepts or interpretations. 
 
3 Families and schools 
 
It is hardly surprising that the role of family structure and of schools in 
influencing behaviour has been widely studied. Mora (1997) finds that in modelling 
attendance at the school level that a large number of school characteristics have an 
impact. In particular she shows that many proxies for school or teacher quality (e.g. 
teachers salaries, the provision of vocational counselling) have the expected positive 
effect on attendance. School size has the opposite effect. Ginther and Pollak (2003) 
analyse in some detail the effect of family structure on both behavioural measures and 
academic performance using data on US High School students. Their main concern is 
with the distinction between children reared in traditional nuclear families and those 
reared in other structures whether single parent families or blended families (one 
biological parent and a step parent. In terms of academic outcomes there is a well 
determined penalty associated with being from a single parent or blended family. Birth 
order effects are virtually non-existence though there is some negative effect from having 
many siblings, most likely reflecting a dilution of parental resources. When they consider 
the impact on an index of behavioural problems there are no significant effects of family 
structure. Carlson and Corcoran (2001) also use the NLSY to look at behavioural 
problems using an index based on mothers reports and find substantial evidence of 
arrange of family effects. Most interestingly from the point of view of this paper they find 
that first borns are less likely to have behavioural problems. This is, arguably, consistent 
with Sulloway type arguments. 
Powell and Steelman(1990) go beyond considering the number of siblings to 
consider sibling density (the number of siblings closely spaced versus widely spaced) as 
well as the sex composition of siblings, Using data for the USA they find that the 
negative effect of sibship size on academic performance is stronger  when the siblings are 




  44 Data & methods 
 
Most of the data on which the current literature on birth-order effects is American. 
However the essence of the Sulloway hypothesis would suggest that these mechanisms 
should work in all societies since the underlying mechanisms are universal. It is therefore 
important to consider testing using data from a much wider range of countries. Finding 
data which is comparable across countries is not usually easy; however the Program for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) compiled by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) allows this. There are thirty countries in the data 
but to allow one to analyse results in more detail I choose to test the theory on just six 
countries: Germany, Ireland, Korea, Mexico, Russian and the USA with a total 
population of approximately 675 million people. The choice of these six is somewhat 
arbitrary but they are chosen on the basis of them being a reasonably diverse set of 
countries.  
The reason for collecting this data is to compare student abilities in reading, 
science and mathematics across countries. However a wide range of other information 
both on the individual student, their families and their schools is available.  The outcomes 
that are analysed here are students’ (self reported) incidence of missing school, missing 
classes or being late for school. Each student was asked how many times in the previous 
two weeks did they (a) miss school (b) skip classes and (c) arrive late for school. There 
were four possible answers to each (i) none, (ii) once or twice, (iii) three of four times  
(iv) five times or more. 
In general the vast majority of responses fell into the first two categories so the 
last three categories were combined into one
5. So for each of the three questions, one has 
a binary variable indicating simply whether they did or did not miss class etc in the last 
two weeks.  In analysing the three possible outcomes it is implausible that they are 
independent: children who do one are more likely to do another. Hence simultaneous 
estimation is required. Estimating a tri-variate probit is computationally difficult since it 
involves evaluating three-dimensional Normal integrals in the likelihood function. While 
it is possible to do this using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulated 
maximum likelihood estimator
6, a disadvantage of this is that its unclear how one can 
estimate the marginal effects: that is the estimated impact of the covariates on the 
                                                 
5 See Table 1. 
  5probability of the outcomes of interest as distinct from the usual probit coefficients. Since 
the former are far more interesting than the usual probit coefficients I simplify the model 
further by combining outcomes (a) and (b), defined as Truancy, indicating whether the 
individual either missed school or skipped class or did neither. The other outcome of 
interest, Lateness,  is simply (c) above: whether they ever report being late for school. 
Hence we estimate a bivariate probit using standard maximum likelihood methods.  
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics on the three variables on which the two 
dependant variables are based as well the dependent variables themselves. 
 
5 Empirical specification 
 
As independent covariates I pick, in addition to indicators of birth order, a range 
of variables pertaining to the individual and their school which are likely to influence 
school conduct. Since children who have more older siblings necessarily have more 
siblings, other things ceteris paribus, the number of siblings is included as a control. This 
could be of interest in its own right since parents may find it more difficult to exercise 
control in larger families. I use the same covariate for both the outcomes (Truancy and 
Lateness) since there are no obvious exclusions restrictions and to ensure comparability 
the same specification is used for each country.  
One variable that is not included in the specification is any measure of the 
student’s academic ability or performance. This is not because it is absent from the data 
(the main purpose of the data was to collect measures of ability in reading, mathematics 
and science) but because it is far from clear which way the causal relationship lies: does 
poor performance at school cause bad attendance or vice-versa? One could, in principle, 
address using some two-step methods to control for endogeneity of ability
7. However this 
requires estimating a structural model and it is not clear what exclusion restrictions can be 
plausibly made to ensure identification of the parameters of interest. 
One should be clear that there are many other possible covariates that could be 
analysed, the PISA data contains an embarrassment of riches in terms of school and 
individual characteristics and the paper has also not explored interactions between 
variables. The number of possible specifications is virtually infinite however the 
                                                                                                                                                     
6 A  procedure in Stata, due to Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) allows this. See Greene(2003) for an 
introduction to simulated maximum likelihood estimation. 
7 See Bosworth (1994) for an analysis of the effect of truancy on school performance. 
  6specification was chosen after some experimentation to try capture the most likely 




(i) Birth  order  effects 
The underlying hypothesis in this paper is that rebelliousness in the sense of 
Sulloway is consistent with poor attendance at school whether it is being late, skipping 
classes or missing school. So the results from the estimation of the bivariate probits allow 
us several tests of the hypothesis for each country. I define H1 as the hypothesis that the 
eldest is less likely to have poor attendance, H2 that the youngest is more likely and H3 
that the more older siblings there are, the more likely they are. H4 is the test that birth 
order effects are not jointly statistically significant for the two outcomes. Tests for the 
joint significance of the three birth order variables in each of the two equations separately 
will be presented. 
The H1 hypothesis can be examined by simply considering the coefficient on 
“oldest” for the 12 outcomes and doing a standard (one tailed) test for a negative 
coefficient. A 5% significance level gives a critical value of 1.65. Looking across Table 
4, two of the coefficients conform to the theory: Korea for the truancy outcome and 
Russia for lateness. In the former case if the individual is the oldest they are about 5.5% 
less likely to miss school. This might seem very small but from Table 1 one can see that 
only 20% report positive levels of truancy (predominantly missing days of school rather 
than skipping classes) so the proportionate effect is sizeable. The corresponding marginal 
effect for Russia is just over 4% but this is small given that being late is much more 
common there (36%). Overall however only two out of twelve of the results conform to 
the theory. 
To examine H2, we carry out a similar one tailed test on the coefficient on 
“youngest”. Only in Mexico, where we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient 
for being late is positive, do the results conform to the theory. Interestingly several of the 
coefficients pass a one tailed test for being negative (truancy in Korea and in Russia). 
To examine H3 we test whether the coefficient on the number of older siblings is 
positive. Only in Russia does the coefficient for truancy conform to theory where 
curiously we saw that being youngest has the “wrong sign”. In effect as one moves down 
  7the birth order (i.e. as one has more older siblings) one conforms to the theory but this 
effect is reversed for the individual who is youngest. This is somewhat consistent with the 
result found in Saroglou and Fiasse (2003) where it is middle-borns who are born to 
rebel. The more older siblings one has the more competition there is for familial 
resources but an advantage accrues to the youngest perhaps the parents can devote any 
“residual” effort to them since there is no one younger. 
Our final hypothesis, H4, simply tests, for each country, for the joint significance 
of all three birth order variables for each equation separately and for all six in each 
country’s system of two equations using standard Wald tests. Since these are two tailed 
tests one is testing whether birth order matters in general rather in the manner specified 
by the theory. These results in Table 3 essentially bear out the individual tests discussed 
above. At the 95% level, only in Russia are the birth order effects jointly significant for 
the system of equations ‘though at lower levels, the coefficients in Korea and Mexico 
kick in (88% and 93% respectively). At the level of the individual outcome there is 
somewhat more evidence of birth order effects i.e. for Truancy in Korea. 
So what is one to conclude? Overall there is some evidence on favour of the 
hypothesis that birth order affects school attendance in the manner that one would expect 
from Sulloway’s arguments but for the most part one can reject these arguments. It is of 
course possible that birth order effects become more pronounced as individuals reach 
adulthood but there is no a priori reason for doing so and the opposite pattern seems 
more plausible. So these results add to the existing corpus of research casting doubt on 
the Sulloway hypothesis. 
 
(ii)  Family background effects 
 
The probit models contain an array of indicators of family background. There is 
no data on parental or household income but parental education and a standard index of 
the parents’ occupational status. A common finding in much of the literature on 
children’s educational and social development is the existence of a penalty due to not 
living in a nuclear family. The argument is complicated by the fact that there are clearly a 
variety of alternatives to living with both biological parents. McLanahan and Sandefur 
(1994) argue that living with a step-parent (and a biological parent) generated similar 
outcomes to living with one parent only, a finding recently contradicted by Ginther and 
  8Pollak (2003). A further complication largely ignored in the literature is the presence of 
dynamic effects. That is family circumstances change and it may be the length of a 
child’s “exposure” to a particular situation that determines the outcome. However 
typically cross section data available do not permit an analysis of this issue. The PISA 
data has relatively detailed questions on family structure so it is possible to distinguish 
between the presence of biological and step-parents. However in the analysis only one 
variable, for living in a single parent household, is included as other outcomes were not 
statistically significant. 
From Table 4 one can see that there is a positive effect on truancy arising from 
being in a single parent family for Germany, Ireland and Mexico but not otherwise. This 
seems surprising since one might expect single parents (around 90% of which are female) 
to be less in a position to exercise control or influence over their children’s behaviour. In 
a similar vein it might be thought that working mothers would have less control over their 
children’s school attendance but when this was included it was statistically significant in 
only 1 of the 12 outcomes (on truancy in Korea) hence it was omitted. However 
interpretation of this parameter is not simple. Working mothers will generate higher 
family income, unobserved in this data, which might be correlated with better educational 
outcomes. 
Turning to socio-economic background, there may be a presumption that children 
from better backgrounds are better behaved. However it is not clear what the a priori 
grounds for this are. Children whose parents are well educated may be better informed 
about education and place a greater value on it. Whether they exercise greater influence 
on their children is quite a different matter. There could be also a genetic link but this 
seems tenuous. Just as there are several channels through which parents socio-economic 
status may have an effect, there are several ways in which one might empirically address 
the issue.  
While economists would tend to favour a monetary measure such as household 
income, sociologists would prefer some indicator of social class or occupational status. 
Within sociology there is a choice between categorical class schema along the lines 
developed by Goldthorpe and Erikson (e.g. Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portacarero, 1983), 
prestige scales (e.g. Goldthorpe and Hope(1972)) or indices of occupational status ( also 
called a Socio-economic index, SEI) . These approaches are not independent and there 
are close empirical and theoretical links between the latter two approaches. This paper 
  9uses an index of occupational status developed by Ganzeboom et al (1992) for several 
reasons. Firstly it is provided in the data for each of the parents. Secondly as a continuous 
measure it is both more convenient to use and exploits the variation in the data better. 
There are also a priori reasons; Featherman and Hauser (1976) conclude that “prestige 
scores are `error prone’ estimates of the socio-economic attributes of occupations”.  
An SEI can be thought of as measuring “the attributes of occupation that convert a 
person’s main resource (education) into a person’s main reward (income)” (Ganzeboom 
et al, 1992, p9). Specifically it is a weighted average of mean income and mean education 
for each occupation using a simple optimal scaling algorithm. It is optimal in the sense 
that maximizes the indirect effect of education on income (via occupation) and minimizes 
the direct effect. It is normal to allow for age as a confounding factor. In this paper, the 
highest SEI (of the mother or father) is used. 
In addition we include dummy variables representing the father’s highest level of 
education completed using UNESCO’s (1997) ISCED classification. Specifically a 
dummy variable for “medium education” corresponds to ISCED levels 2, 3B and 3C and 
a dummy variable for “high education” corresponds to ISCED levels 3A, 5 and above
8. 
Mothers education level is not included simply because it is highly correlated with that of 
fathers and initial investigations suggested strongly that it would be impossible to 
distinguish between the two.  
Turning to the individual coefficients in Table 4, in only two out of twelve cases 
is there a statistically significant effect of parents socio-background ( Lateness in Ireland 
and Truancy in Mexico) and in both cases, those from better off backgrounds are more 
likely to display “bad behaviour”. So whatever benefits more socially advantaged parents 
are able to pass on to their children, better school attendance is apparently not one of 
them.  
To get an idea of the size of the effects, consider the case of Mexico. The index 
ranges from 16 to 90 with a median of 40 and the inter-quartile range is 24 (=53-29). So 
comparing two children whose parents lie at the first and third quartiles of the socio-
economic index, the latter are about 5% (24 x .002) more likely to exhibit truancy in a 
                                                 
8 The omitted category is therefore ISCED 1 (completed Primary education) or less. ISCED level 2 is the 
junior cycle of secondary education. 3A is secondary education designed to access third level academic 
education. 3B and 3C are secondary programs designed to access more practical, vocational streams. Levels 
5 and 6 correspond to tertiary education. 
  10two-week period. This should be compared with the average incidence there of 50% 
(from Table 1). 
The evidence form considering the effects of father’s education presents a 
somewhat different picture. In Germany, Russia and the USA there is evidence that 
higher father’s education contributes to better school attendance. In the USA, having a 
father with college level education has a particularly strong effect with truancy being over 
12% lower. Tests for the joint significance of the three variables in the system of 
equations are given in Table 3: only in Ireland, Russia and the USA are they statistically 
significant. 
Overall the impact of parental background on the outcomes of interest is 
somewhat underwhelming. The results are dependent on how we have modelled socio-
economic background; however given the data available the results are generally robust. 
For example allowing a quadratic specification for the SEI index does not change the 
results, nor does replacing it with a series of indicator variables for its quintiles.   
 
(iii) School  effects 
 
The possibility that characteristics of the school or the child’s attitudes towards 
school may affect their behaviour with regard to attendance hardly needs justification. 
The main difficulty is knowing exactly what to look for: PISA is an extraordinarily rich 
dataset. There are many possible measures of school quality as well as details of how the 
respondent’s experience. After some experimentation , six variables were included in the 
model. 
Two are commonly used in much of the literature on school effects, class size and 
an indicator of whether the school is private or public (this is missing for Russia). The 
other four are based in the student’s responses to a series of questions eliciting their 
attitudes to various aspects. One picks up on the students opinions of whether the teachers 
are good, a second measures whether the students think that there is a good disciplinary 
climate in the school and a third measures the students they feel they belong in the 
  11school. A fourth question measures the level of social interaction between the children 
and their parents
9.  
In the extensive economics literature on class size effects there is much debate on 
the existence or otherwise of class size effects on educational outcomes such as student 
academic performance. In a meta-analysis of the literature, Hanushek (1997) finds that 
the evidence in support of such effects is neither strong nor consistent. However Krueger 
(2003) has argued that this can be explained by methodological weaknesses in the meta-
analysis and finds strong evidence of positive school quality effects. In general the results 
here indicate that higher class size is associated with worse attendance as one might 
expect ‘though Mexico and the USA are exceptions and the sizes of the effects are fairly 
modest. In large classes teachers are more stretched and have less opportunity to monitor 
individual behaviour including attendance. This variable may also be reflecting other 
unmeasured aspects of school quality which are correlated with class size.  One might 
expect the same issue to arise within families with parents having less control in larger 
families but the evidence from the coefficients on the number of siblings suggest 
otherwise. 
There is some evidence of the benefits of private schooling with lower truancy in 
Korean and, especially, the US and better punctuality in Mexico. Overall the effects are 
small and money, at least for these purposes, does not appear to matter. 
One feature that has a fairly consistent effect in improving attendance is the 
respondents attitude to teachers. Where students think well of their teachers they are less 
likely to miss school or turn up late with a one standard deviation change in this variable 
typically reducing the probability by around 4%.  A second consistent finding is that the 
school’s disciplinary climate (or more precisely, the students’ perception of it) matters: 
where students perceive disciplinary as bad in the school they are more likely to have 
poor attendance. 
Students’ sense of belonging (to the school) is for the most part not statistically 
significant ‘though it is associated with better behaviour in a small number of cases. 
Somewhat perversely, in Ireland, it actually increases the probability of being late.  One 
can only conjecture that their sense of belonging is “too high” such that they consider 
                                                 
9 The last three of the questions come “packaged” in the data & are named Disclima, Belong and Soccom 
respectively. The first question I created based on the responses to Question 30, using factor analysis. All 
four variables are standardised to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Note that high values 
of Disclima correspond to poor disciplinary climate contrary to OECD(2002). 
  12school as an extension of the home environment and are correspondingly relaxed about 




This paper uses data on six countries from the Program for International Student 
Assessment database to analyse the effect of birth order and other family characteristics. 
The analysis of birth order effects is motivated by the well known hypothesis of Frank 
Sulloway developed in his 1996 monograph Born to Rebel in which he argued that first 
borns were more likely to be conservative and orthodox while the later borns were more 
likely to be rebellious. Using school attendance, whether being late, missing school or 
skipping classes, as one manifestation of rebelliousness, the evidence here provides very 
little support for the thesis. This paper joins a lengthening series of papers that are at 
odds with the hypothesis. Most these have considered one country only, usually the 
USA, but the underlying psychological mechanisms behind the hypothesis are not 
culture specific and indeed Sulloway’s evidence is based on a wide range of data from 
many countries and eras. It follows that using data from a diverse set of six countries 
provides a good test of the theory. Since the respondents are 15 years old, the absence of 
birth effects at this age suggests that they are even less likely to be found later. 
Aside from birth order, the paper finds little evidence that socio-economic 
background of the parents’ matter. This is perhaps more surprising since in general one 
would expect that more socio-economically advantaged parents would inculcate better 
behaviour. However a number of important determinants of school attendance emerge: 
smaller class sizes help, as does a positive experience of teachers by the children. Private 
schools in some cases lend themselves to better behaviour. 
Aside from serving as an indicator of youthful rebelliousness does school 
attendance matter? Clearly it matters to educators and parents who consistently 
demonstrate their concern over it. It is also notable that recent economics literature on 
the returns to schooling there has been much emphasis on the influence of student 
behaviour on academic and hence economic outcomes
10.  
                                                 
10 See for example  Carneiro and Heckman (2004). 
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Table 1: 
Dependent variables:  Germany: Ireland:    Korea: Mexico: Russia: USA: 
            
           
Truant:  0.31 0.47 0.20  0.50  0.50  0.44 
  (0.01) (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.01)  (0.008) 
           
Late:  0.28 0.34 0.03  0.48  0.36  0.34 
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.004)  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.008) 
           
Miss class – days:           
None  0.88 0.88 0.96  0.68  0.64  0.76 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.004)  (0.012) (0.009)  (0.007) 
1 or 2  0.09 0.09 0.03  0.27  0.27  0.18 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)  (0.012) (0.007)  (0.005) 
3 or 4  0.01 0.02 0.01  0.03  0.05  0.03 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) 
5 or more  0.01 0.01 0.00  0.02  0.05  0.03 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) 
           
Miss school – days:           
None  0.74 0.58 0.81  0.68  0.65  0.65 
  (0.01) (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
1 or 2  0.21 0.34 0.13  0.28  0.26  0.28 
  (0.008) (0.01) (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
3 or 4  0.03 0.06 0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.002) 
5 or more  0.02 0.03 0.03  0.01  0.04  0.03 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) 
           
Arrive late – days:           
None  0.72 0.65 0.97  0.51  0.64  0.65 
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.004)  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.008) 
1 or 2  0.21 0.26 0.02  0.41  0.27  0.26 
  (0.009) (0.01) (0.003)  (0.01)  (0.009)  (0.005) 
3 or 4  0.04 0.06 0.01  0.06  0.05  0.05 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.001)  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.003) 
5 or more  0.03 0.03 0.01  0.01  0.04  0.04 
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.003) 
            
N: 4126  3422  3171  3741  5318  2760 
            







  17Table 2: Descriptive statistics of covariates :  means & standard deviations 
   German
y 
Ireland Korea  Mexico Russia  USA 
          
Girl
1:  0.509 0.501 0.421 0.497  0.515  0.541 
  (0.015) (0.032) (0.039) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) 
Socio-economic  index:  49.451  48.365  42.934  42.818 49.828 52.725 
  (0.55) (0.541)  (0.662)  (0.814) (0.523) (0.666) 
Father’s education: medium
1:  0.459 0.244 0.335 0.244  0.113  0.098 
  (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) 
Father’s education: high
1:  0.388 0.473 0.524 0.280  0.745  0.784 
  (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.02)  (0.008)  (0.015) 
Single parent family
1:  0.150 0.113 0.076 0.152  0.190  0.193 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.01) 
Number of siblings:  1.548  2.620  1.303  2.969  1.751  2.384 
  (0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.069) (0.039) (0.048) 
Oldest
1:  0.271 0.229 0.277 0.249  0.212  0.228 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012) 
Youngest
1:  0.386 0.363 0.509 0.282  0.436  0.359 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.01) 
Number older siblings:  1.835  2.552  1.826  2.617  2.005  2.321 
  (0.021) (0.029) (0.025) (0.044) (0.022) (0.033) 
Good teachers at school
2:  0.019 -0.006 0.049 0.014  0.000  0.064 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.031) 
Parental social interest
2:  0.003 -0.023 0.070 0.002  0.017  0.032 
  (0.019) (0.02) (0.032)  (0.026) (0.017) (0.025) 
School disciplinary climate
2:  0.094 0.010 -0.039  -0.009 -0.010 -0.022 
  (0.029) (0.028) (0.034) (0.033) (0.025) (0.034) 
Sense of belonging
2:  0.029 0.003 0.057 0.020  0.022  0.036 
  (0.029) (0.02) (0.026)  (0.024) (0.019) (0.025) 
Town
1:  0.620 0.452 0.163 0.444  0.315  0.507 
  (0.036) (0.044) (0.034) (0.041) (0.034) (0.047) 
City
1:  0.204 0.252 0.821 0.398  0.377  0.228 
  (0.029) (0.038) (0.035) (0.04)  (0.035)  (0.038) 
Average class size:  23.908  22.505  37.214  34.838 23.561 23.353 
  (0.229) (0.257) (0.548) (0.789) (0.328) (0.344) 
Private school
1:  0.042 0.610 0.529 0.164    0.061 
  (0.014) (0.043) (0.046) (0.031)    (0.025) 
          
N:  4126 3422 3171 3741  5318  2760 
          
1- Dummy variable 
2- Normalised subjective measure 
 
Standard deviation in parenthesis 
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Table 3:           
Tests for joint 
significance:  
Germany Ireland  Korea  Mexico Russia  USA 
           
Single equation tests:          
Birth order effects:              
χ
2 (3) – truancy 
equation  0.320 0.340  9.080 3.990  8.970  0.650 
                                       (0.9554) (0.9514)  (0.0283) (0.262) (0.0297)  (0.8849) 
χ
2 (3) – lateness 
equation  3.030 0.500  1.240 6.640  6.550  5.690 
  (0.3876) (0.9183)  (0.7423) (0.0844) (0.0879) (0.1278) 
           
System tests:          
Birth order effects:            
χ
2 (6)  3.320 0.830  10.160  11.610  15.580  6.870 
  (0.768) (0.9914)  (0.1181)  (0.0713) (0.0162) (0.3326) 
Family background 
effects:   9.270 16.670  3.340 15.430  6.210  46.900 
χ
2 (6)  (0.1588) (0.0106)  (0.7652) (0.0172)  (0.4002)  (0) 
            
p>χ
2  in parenthesis           
 
 
Notes :  
1.  “Birth order effects” tests for the joint significance of the three birth order variables (oldest, 
youngest, number of older siblings) in either the single equations separately or the two jointly 
(in the lower panel).  
2.  “Family background effects” tests the joint significance of the socio-economic index and the 
two father’s education level variables in the two equations. 
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Table 4: Marginal effects from bivariate probit 
 Germany  Ireland  Rep.  of  Korea 
 Truant:  Late:  Truant: Late: Truant:  Late: 
         
Girl
1: 0.064  -0.038  0.020  -0.044  -0.006  0.005 
 (3.85)  (-2.51)  (0.91)  (-1.92)  (-0.35)  (0.75) 
Socio-economic index:  0.000  0.001  -0.001  0.002  0.001  0.000 
 (0.58)  (0.84)  (-1.62)  (2.8)  (1.14)  (-0.18) 
Father ‘s education:medium
1:  -0.029  -0.068 0.004 0.011 -0.003  0.011 
 (-1.05)  (-2.6)  (0.19)  (0.43)  (-0.12)  (1.07) 
Father ‘s education:high
1: -0.030  -0.052  -0.018  -0.001  0.005  0.008 
 (-1.17)  (-2.01)  (-0.84)  (-0.06)  (0.24)  (0.84) 
Single parent family
1:  0.105 0.043 0.090 0.049 0.034  0.014 
  (3.91) (1.71) (2.81) (1.72) (1.16)  (1.13) 
Number of siblings:  0.010  0.022  0.011  0.021  0.004  0.001 
  (0.87) (1.92) (0.99) (1.85) (0.19)  (0.21) 
Oldest
1: -0.006  -0.028  0.007  -0.016  -0.055  -0.005 
 (-0.26)  (-1.09)  (0.22)  (-0.55)  (-2.39)  (-0.77) 
Youngest
1:  -0.011 0.003 -0.015 0.006 -0.043  -0.002 
  (-0.46) (0.13) (-0.55) (0.23) (-1.77)  (-0.23) 
Number older siblings:  0.004  0.002  0.007  -0.003  -0.007  0.002 
 (0.19)  (0.12)  (0.41)  (-0.19)  (-0.25)  (0.26) 
Good teachers at school
2:  -0.040 -0.055 -0.072 -0.057 -0.030  -0.002 
 (-5.03)  (-6)  (-6.82)  (-5.58)  (-3.52)  (-0.66) 
Parental social interest
2: 0.003  0.017  -0.007  -0.032  -0.012  -0.004 
 (0.33)  (1.91)  (-0.6)  (-3.42)  (-1.61)  (-1.81) 
School disciplinary climate
2: 0.047 0.048 0.027 0.050 0.024  0.003 
 (5.11)  (4.84)  (2.84)  (6.1)  (2.79)  (1.1) 
Sense of belonging
2:  -0.002 0.005 -0.013 0.018 -0.033  -0.012 
  (-0.31) (0.64) (-1.35) (2.13) (-3.14)  (-3.52) 
Town
1: -0.034  -0.001  0.054  0.008  0.059  0.039 
 (-1.05)  (-0.02)  (1.91)  (0.25)  (0.68)  (1.25) 
City
1:  0.032 0.058 0.099 0.097 0.077  0.016 
  (0.93) (1.43) (3.17) (2.56) (1.21)  (1.49) 
Average class size:  -0.007  -0.011 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003  -0.001 
  (-2.55) (-4.82) (-2.52) (-3.31) (-4.29)  (-3.85) 
Private school
1:  -0.053 0.072 -0.046 0.029 -0.054  -0.014 
  (-0.98) (1.53) (-1.81) (1.02) (-3.38) (-2.3) 
         
N:  4126 4126 3422 3422 3171  3171 
         
rho: 0.28  0.17  0.44 
standard error:  0.029  0.024  0.052 
 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
1- Dummy variable 
2- Normalised subjective measure 








  20Table 4: Marginal effects from bivariate probit: 
 Mexico:  Russia:  USA: 
  Truant: Late: Truant: Late: Truant: Late: 
          
Girl
1:  -0.026 -0.020 -0.057 -0.083  0.084  0.028 
  (-1.26) (-1.05) (-3.32) (-5.39)  (3.95)  (1.32) 
Socio-economic  index:  0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.34)  (0.95)  (-1)  (-0.94)  (-1.14)  (-1.51) 
Father’s education:medium 
1 0.027 0.021 -0.066  -0.006 0.043 -0.010 
 (1.31)  (0.9)  (-1.98)  (-0.2)  (1)  (-0.21) 
Father’s education: high
1: 0.040  0.030  -0.040  0.015  -0.126  -0.067 
 (1.24)  (1.15)  (-1.58)  (0.62)  (-3.14)  (-1.91) 
Single parent family
1:  0.056 -0.007 -0.005 0.021  0.034  0.016 
  (2.52) (-0.25) (-0.18) (0.89)  (1.29)  (0.69) 
Number of siblings:  -0.001  0.013  -0.013  -0.002  0.011  0.013 
 (-0.16)  (1.25)  (-1.51)  (-0.27)  (0.81)  (1.19) 
Oldest
1: -0.026  -0.042  0.017  -0.042  -0.003  -0.039 
 (-0.87)  (-1.61)  (0.69)  (-1.72)  (-0.1)  (-1.28) 
Youngest
1: 0.001  0.048  -0.040  -0.005  0.026  0.033 
 (0.04)  (1.84)  (-1.85)  (-0.27)  (0.79)  (1.11) 
Number older siblings:  0.008  -0.019 0.050 0.010  -0.009 -0.005 
  (0.53) (-1.3) (2.98) (0.63) (-0.43) (-0.28) 
Good teachers at school
2:  -0.045 -0.010 -0.042 -0.033  -0.042  -0.034 
  (-3.93) (-1.04) (-4.45) (-3.99)  (-3.52)  (-3.38) 
Parental social interest
2:  -0.008 -0.031 -0.015 -0.034  -0.013  -0.027 
  (-0.83)  (-3.19) (-1.5) (-3.42) (-1.07) (-2.63) 
School disciplinary climate
2:  0.068 0.017 0.071 0.063  0.029  0.005 
  (6.76) (1.54) (9.03) (7.82)  (2.91)  (0.54) 
Sense of belonging
2: -0.031  -0.025  -0.009  0.014  0.005  0.000 
  (-3.56) (-2.8) (-0.87) (1.51)  (0.44)  (0.00) 
Town
1: 0.061  0.034  -0.021  -0.027  -0.008  -0.090 
 (1.76)  (1.01)  (-0.79)  (-0.93)  (-0.24)  (-2.75) 
City
1: 0.061  0.065  0.022  -0.062  0.098  0.038 
 (1.61)  (1.8)  (0.75)  (-2)  (2.68)  (1.01) 
Average class size:  -0.001  0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003  0.000 
 (-1.34)  (1.86)  (-1.15)  (-2.55)  (-1.4)  (0.18) 
Private school
1: -0.026  -0.068      -0.153  0.008 
 (-0.63)  (-1.97)      (-3.39)  (0.12) 
          
N:  3741 3741 5318 5318 2760  2760 
          
rho: 0.21  0.19  0.33 
standard error:  0.028  0.026  0.033 
           
t-statistics in parenthesis 
1- Dummy variable 
2- Normalised subjective measure 
Rho is the estimated correlation between the two equations  
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